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Executive Summary A wide range of interest groups target the European
Parliament (EP) and MEPs have a reputation for being particularly open to
diffuse interests, who, due to their limited resources, use ‘friendly’ MEPs to put
pressure on the European Commission and the Council. The notion of the EP
representing diffuse as opposed to concentrated interests, conflicts with the
broader political science literature on interest groups that dwells on business
bias. The general expectation in the literature is for concentrated groups (such as
the automobile industry) to prevail over diffuse interests (such as environmental
interests). This article considers whether this is a case of conventional wisdom
confirmed – or a sectoral exceptionalism. In fact, there are good reasons to
doubt the EP’s reputation as a policy champion for diffuse interests. Much of
our current knowledge about the EP’s interest group politics stems from a time
when the EP’s legislative powers were more limited. Within a relatively short
time span the EP has evolved from a token ‘multi-lingual talking shop’ to, what
some researchers have named, one of the most powerful elected legislatures in
the world. Arguably, as the powers of the EP have increased, so has attention
from interest groups. Few interest groups now dare leave the parliamentary
arena to their opponents, and most interest groups adopt a belt-and-braces
approach in which ‘the institutional trio’ (the European Commission, Council
and the EP) is lobbied throughout the policy process. The increased powers
raises the question of whether the EP still privileges diffuse interests or simply
reinforces the advantages of concentrated interests. This question is addressed in
this article by examining one recent regulation: Regulation 2011/510/EC on the
reduction of CO2 emissions from light commercial vehicles. Based on process-
tracing of EU documents and lobbying letters, and interviews with MEPs, EP
officials and interest groups, this article shows that the EP is no longer an
environmental champion, but instead appears to be more of an environ-
mental pragmatist. Three factors contribute to this change: asymmetric lobbying
from industry, a change in the EP’s negotiating strategy and increased coop-
eration between the EP committees. These changes have reduced the privileged
position once held by diffuse interests, and provided concentrated interests with
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a more advantageous European parliamentary arena in which they can advance
their demands.
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In February 2011, the European Parliament (EP) adopted legislation to reduce
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from light commercial vehicles (known as the
‘vans regulation’) after reaching a first reading agreement with the Council.
The EP agreed to a text that watered down the European Commission’s
proposal by voting for lowering CO2 emission targets proposed for vans and
reducing penalties for non-compliance. While the majority of MEPs took the
view that ‘the van industry’s dire economic situation and long production
cycles merited “more carrot and less stick” ’(EurActiv, 2010), environmental
organisations and several Members of the European Parliament (MEPs)
criticised the EP for caving in to lobbying pressure from the automobile
industry, and voting against the interests of consumers, small businesses, and
the environment’. The outcome of the vans regulation goes against the EP’s
reputation as a policy champion for environmental groups.
The EP was portrayed as ‘an environmental champion’ (Burns, 2005),
‘a defender of environmental interests’ (Weale et al, 2000) that is ‘predestined to
save the earth’ (Judge, 1992). Indeed, researchers often conclude that ‘environ-
mental NGOs have a natural ally in the shape of the EP, whose members are
quick to take up concerns popular with their electorate’ (Greenwood, 2011,
p. 158). This reputation has been earned mainly due to the activities of its
influential Environment, Public Health and Food Safety committee (ENVI).
However, more recent studies (Smith, 2008; Burns and Carter, 2010) suggest
that the EP’s green credentials have decreased with an increase in the EP’s
legislative powers. Perhaps this can be taken as a sign of the EP’s interest
groups politics starting to look more ‘normal’ in which common assumptions
in the interest group literature – for concentrated interests to prevail over
diffuse interests – find resonance in the EP. The aim of this article is to
understand why the EP accepted a text on the vans regulation that diluted the
environmental ambition of the European Commission’s proposal instead of
serving as a champion for environmental groups. The vans regulation is
chosen because it represents a typical example of an EU regulation in terms
of being subject to the ordinary legislative procedure, a revision of an existing
piece of legislation, and a re-regulatory policy (replacing national rules with
common EU rules).
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The article is based on observations of EP committee meetings, analyses of
EU documents, emails sent to MEPs, interest groups’ position papers and
lobbying letters as well as 27 interviews with interest groups, EU officials and
MEPs.1 The article is organised as follows. The next section introduces the
theoretical framework; then examines the various arguments used by the car
industry and environmental interests before analysing the impact lobbying has
had on the EP’s policy process and outcome.
The Influence of Interest Groups in the EP
The question of ‘who gets what and how’ is decisive in shaping the reactions of
interest groups to a given policy. As Lowi (1964) and Wilson (1974) maintain,
the type of policy shapes the policy arena and the actors who mobilise to mould
legislation. Political action is easier to stimulate when the benefits to be
maintained or the costs to be avoided are concentrated on a particular group.
It is generally maintained that, ‘Since people are more sensitive to losses than
gains, losers are more likely to mobilize politically than winners’ (Daugbjerg
and Svendesen, 2001, p. 134). Reducing CO2 emissions from light duty vehicles
is typical example of what Wilson (1974) would call ‘entrepreneurial politics’,
in which the costs of improving environmental standards are concentrated on a
specific and easily identifiable group (the automobile industry), and the
benefits widely distributed to society as a whole. In such a scenario, the general
expectation is for opponents to have strong incentives to organise to reduce, or
at least not increase, the burden of regulation. On the contrary, those
benefiting from a policy lack selective incentives necessary for overcoming
typical barriers to collective action (Olson, 1965). Policy will be blocked, or
watered down, by vested interests that benefit from the status quo unless a
policy entrepreneur takes an active role in guiding the legislation towards
fruition.
In the EU system of multi-level governance involving a very diverse set of
actors, ‘costs’ flowing from legislation include economic loss, loss of decision-
making competences resulting from relinquishing powers to ‘Brussels’ and the
costs associated with instrumental adjustment to a new regulatory framework.
A great majority of EU decisions taken entail one or the other type of costs for
those involved. Lobbying of the EP is therefore not confined to the usual
suspects (non-governmental organisations, businesses/industries, public affairs
companies), but also includes ‘the institutional lobbyists’ (such the govern-
ments of the EU’s member states and non-EU countries). Environmental
regulation is primarily dealing with cross-border problems – such as pollution –
that cannot sufficiently be dealt with by individual member states. Although
member states might have a common interest in providing a public good and in
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improving the environment, there are marked differences regarding the
anticipated benefits of environmental regulation, and the willingness to bear
the costs of higher environmental standards (Scharpf, 1997). For example,
‘Southern member states seeking to widen their industrial base may find it
more burdensome than their Northern counterparts to finance the installation
of environmental technology’ (He´ritier, 1999, p. 52). Or member states,
experiencing low growth and high unemployment, might find other issues more
pressing to address than promoting ambitious, and costly, environmental
standards during a financial downturn. Thus, the positions taken up by
member states and MEPs differ according to the economic interests at stake,
the stringency of domestic environmental legislation and the level of economic
development. As suggested by Scharpf (1997), this might lead to a conflict
between those member states and MEPs who are environmental leaders and
those who are environmental laggards.
If common assumptions about interest group influence – for concentrated
interests to be more successful than diffuse interests – are set in the context of
EU decision-making, how successful might diffuse and concentrated interests
be in influencing policy outcomes? Two features of the EU might reduce the
likelihood of concentrated interests prevailing over diffuse interests: funding of
diffuse interests and the oft-occurring fragmentation of European industry
federations. First, many diffuse interests receive funding from the EU budget,
which has helped diffuse interests in overcoming the Olsonian collective action
problem. In accordance with neo-pluralism, the European Commission has
sought to overcome the inbuilt bias in pluralism by deliberately subsidising and
giving access to diffuse interests. Applicant organisations are required to be
operating at a European level either alone or in the form of several coordinated
associations with a membership base including as a minimum three EU
member states, and activities should mainly be at a European, rather than at an
international, level (European Commission, 2011). In 2011, environmental
non-governmental organisations (ENGOs) received h8 997 284 in EU funding
(European Commission, 2011). Although these arrangements may not fully
prevent the possible dominance of special interests in the EU policy making
process, they do facilitate the representation of diffuse interests.
Second, European industry federations are often described as being inher-
ently weak owing to their inability to reconcile divergent national interests and
to arrive at anything but the lowest common denominator position (Grant,
2011). Producers from different member states often compete with each other
in the EU policy process as they want their national rules to provide the
basis for EU legislation. Contrast this to diffuse interests, such as ENGOs,
who often stand more united as they are fighting for the same cause and
share the same conviction. The ideological cohesiveness of diffuse interests
enables them to build large European networks representing a European view.
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In the environmental field, this is witnessed by the Green 10. Green 10 is
a loose, but coordinated, network of 10 of the largest European green
organisations and networks active at the EU level, which coordinate joint
responses and recommendations to EU decision-makers (Green 10, 2011).
Between the Green 10 ENGOs, there is an ‘informal and unwritten division of
labour to enable the organisation with the natural specialism to take the lead’
(Greenwood, 2011, p. 151). Usually, the relationship among the Green 10
is more harmonious than European business federations as they have the
advantage of more easily being able to construct and maintain broad cross-
national coalitions compared to business interests. Coordination and
cooperation between Green 10 ENGOs have been helped by the occupation
by five of the Green 10 members of the Mundo-b building in Brussels, which
is a sustainable building housing Belgian and European NGOs near the EP.
Despite the EU’s NGO funding, diffuse interests may still be at a dis-
advantage compared to concentrated interests as the former often work on
the ideas level and are less engaged in the specific technical details of policies.
Some EU legislative proposals may be of such a technical nature that only
very few interest groups are able to provide decision-makers with the detailed
information they need regarding the state of the market and the likely
effectiveness of a proposal. The level of technicality both influences decision-
makers dependency on outside expert information as well as the number of
interest groups holding this information. Producers, directly affected by
highly technical internal market legislation, often possess greater technical
expertise compared to diffuse interests, which is an advantage when lobbying
EU decision-makers on highly technical issues.
In the EP, rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs (key MEPs), in particular,
rely extensively on interest groups to provide them with information and to
translate complex and technical information into brief ‘digestible’ notes.
Parliament’s extensive workload gives considerable scope for lobbyists to
influence MEPs, assistants and policy advisors. When drafting the committee
reports, rapporteurs routinely seek out key interest groups to solicit their views.
It is often reported that representatives of European associations have written
large parts of the rapporteur’s report and the amendments proposed by
committee members (Earnshaw and Judge, 2006, p. 64). Unlike the European
Commission, the EP’s consultation of stakeholders is not institutionalised.
Whereas the European Commission often spends 3–4 years preparing a
proposal with advice from a large number of expert and high-level groups, a
rapporteur in the EP only has a few months to prepare a report. The main
information-flow between the EP and interests groups happens via informal
contact during the three stages of committee scrutiny: the rapporteur’s draft
report phase, the open amendment phase and the voting (for more on this, see
Marshall, 2010). During these phases, interest groups send amendments and
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voting lists to MEPs. Lobbying mainly takes place during EP committee
scrutiny rather than before plenary votes. This is because committees are
responsible for examining the details of legislation. MEPs’ default behaviour in
plenary is to follow the voting recommendations of their group (except in the
case of fringe groups) and to adopt the committee report (Ringe, 2010). Thus,
formulating amendments to key MEPs and shaping the content of a committee
report are crucial for determining the EP’s, and in the end, the EU’s legislative
outcome.
In the EU, the type of policy does not only determine the distribution of
costs and benefits on societal groups, but also the choice of decision-making
procedure and the relative influence of the EU’s institutions. There is a large
literature examining under what conditions the EP is particularly likely to have
its amendments reflected in the final text agreed between the EP and the
Council (see for instance Shackleton, 2000; Tsebelis et al, 2001; Kreppel, 2002;
Burns, 2005; Ha¨ge and Kaeding, 2007). Burns (2005) qualitative comparative
case study of the EP’s policy influence on Socrates, novel foods and bio-
technology cases shows that the distribution of costs and benefits delivered by
legislation is crucial in determining the EP’s legislative influence vis-a`-vis the
Council. Under a concentrated costs/diffuse benefits configuration, the EP is
particularly likely to see its amendments successfully incorporated into final
legislation when the costs arising from legislation are imposed on industrial
actors rather than member states (for the EP’s influence under other interest
group configuration, see Burns, 2005). The vans regulation represents a
regulatory policy in which the costs of the Commission’s proposal are
concentrated on industrial actors rather than member states. The expectation
from the literature on the EP’s legislative influence (such as Burns, 2005) is for
those interest groups who manage to influence the EP’s policy outcome to be
particularly likely to have their views reflected in the final legislative text.
Interest Group Positions on the Vans Regulation
In November 2009, the European Commission put forward a proposal to
reduce the CO2 emissions from vans (European Commission, 2007). This
proposal suggested that from 1 July 2013, the average specific emissions of new
vans registered in the Community should not exceed 175 g CO2/km. This target
was suggested to be phased in gradually from 1 January 2014 onwards with full
compliance of the new light commercial fleet from 2016. The proposal also set
a long-term target of 135 g/km to be achieved from 2020 subject to
confirmation of its feasibility on the basis of updated impact assessment
results. The proposal mirrored many aspects of the existing car CO2 regulation
in terms of the applied utility parameter (weight), phase-in, a short-term and a
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2020 long-term CO2 reduction target, credits for eco-innovations, and super-
credits (multiple counting of vehicles with particularly low emissions). Given
that many of the modalities were already in place, the discussion on the vans
regulation focused on a limited number of issues, mainly the long-term target,
and the phase-in period. This meant that there was little room for manoeuvre
for interest groups to change the thrust of the legislation as it had to comply
with the basic principles laid out in the passenger cars legislation.
The lobbying spectrum included car manufacturers (such as Ford, BMW,
Volvo, Renault/Peugeot-Citroen, Fiat, Volkswagen, Jaguar Land Rover (JLR),
Toyota), car associations (such as the European Automobile manufacturers
associations, ACEA), and a few number of environmental organisations (mainly
T&E and, to a lesser extent, Greenpeace). Throughout the EU’s decision-making
process, the automotive industry lobbied hard for reducing the long-term target,
the phase-in period and the application date. They pleaded the EU institutions
not to introduce new costly regulation during the financial crisis and questioned
the need to regulate CO2 emissions of vans right from the beginning. ACEA
lobbied for a short-term target of 175 g CO2/km by 2016 with phase-in from
2015 to 2018 and a long-term target of 160 g CO2/km by 2020. On the contrary,
ENGOs lobbied for more ambitious climate targets – a short-term target of 160 g
CO2/km by 2015 and a long-term target of 125 g CO2/km by 2020 – and claimed
that the automotive industry was using the economic downturn as a green-wash
to avoid cutting emissions (for position papers and news releases, see ACEA,
2009, 2011; T&E, 2010a, b).
Unlike the passenger cars regulation, there was no business war between car
manufacturers from different countries as the van market is more homo-
geneous than the passenger car market. This strengthened the position of the
industry as they could largely speak with one voice on key issues. There was,
however, disagreement lurking under the surface on specific issues, such as the
possibility of pooling between cars and vans (averaging between distances to
targets). Some companies were in favour of the possibility of pooling between
cars and vans (such as Ford), whereas companies producing only cars (such as
BMW) were against as they feared they would be put at a competitive dis-
advantage and that it would lead to a reopening of the cars regulation.
T&E welcomed the European Commission’s proposal, but thought that the
long-term target could be more ambitious and wanted to include speed limiters
in the regulation. The European Commission’s proposal was supported by
leasing companies and Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), who believed
that the proposed emissions target for vans would increase fuel efficiency and
reduce the costs for small businesses using vans. Car manufacturers did not
find that the European Commission’s proposal accommodated their views as
they thought it disregarded the economic reality as well as the specific
characteristics of the vehicle segment concerned.
Is the EP still a policy champion for environmental interests?
245r 2012 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2047-7414 Interest Groups & Advocacy Vol. 1, 2, 239–259
All the nine interviewed car manufacturers felt that the European Com-
mission had already made up its mind before conducting stakeholder meetings.
The car industry found it particularly problematic that the vans regulation –
which is in theory both an industry and an environmental issue – was only led
by the general-directorate (DG) for Environment and not jointly together with
the DG for Enterprise and Industry. ‘The problem was that there was no-one
to defend the industry as DG Environment treated the vans regulation as a
pure environmental issue’ (Interview, car industry, July 2011). Furthermore,
the European Commission’s impact assessment was thought to be weak and
incomplete, suffering from inadequate assumptions and data. Many car manu-
facturers depicted DG Environment and DG Climate Action as ‘confronta-
tional’, ‘evangelical’ and on a ‘moralistic crusade’. As one car manufacturer
expressed it, ‘they are getting greener and greener. I think many of them felt
that they didn’t get what they wanted on passenger cars, and therefore went for
a bit more on the vans regulation [y] sometimes it would be nice if the
Commission would put forward more reasonable proposals so we don’t have
to play heavy and go the top of the Commission’ (Interview, July 2011).
One niche car manufacturer, JLR, had to play hardball and lobby at the
College of Commissioners intensively to secure its interests before the
European Commission’s proposal was put forward to the EP and the Council.
Although JLR secured a derogation for small volume manufacturers in earlier
drafts of the vans regulation – in which JLR would negotiate an individual CO2
reduction target with the European Commission – the Environment Commis-
sioner, Dimas, had removed the small volume derogation in his paper sent into
inter-service consultation. This meant that JLR had to spend the whole of
August 2009 ‘whizzing around the heads of cabinets to get the other DGs to see
Dimas’ error’ (Interview, JLR, August 2011). JLR’s sales amounts to less than
1 per cent of total EU sales and primarily include the Defender – a heavy
workhorse vehicle designed to be operable in all duty cycles regardless of
terrain and resistant to damage. Owing to the Defender’s very nature, JLR find
it difficult to make the Defender aerodynamic and fuel efficient. Therefore,
JLR urged the European Commission to insert a small volume derogation with
a vehicle volume cap of 25 000. Owing to intense lobbying from JLR, the
College of Commissioners included the small volume derogation into the
proposal only a few days before the proposal was formally published.
Lobbying Strategies
While the car industry was both more active in lobbying Parliament than
environmental interests, they took up similar lobbying strategies: target key
MEPs, furnish your legislative allies with facts and arguments, and seek to win
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over undecided MEPs. However, the picture is not as crude as depicted in the
American signalling literature, where the general consensus is for interest
groups to primarily lobby their legislative allies, occasionally engage with
fence-sitters, but only rarely approach their opponents (Baumgartner and
Leech, 1996; Kollman, 1997). In the EP, this distinction is less clear as the
formal constraints are such that interest groups often lobby their opponents
(Marshall, 2010). The key is to target those MEPs, who are in charge of the file:
rapporteur and shadow rapporteurs. However, most interviewees find that
lobbying clear opponents is inefficient and often a waste of time; legislative
allies need to be furnished with the necessary facts and arguments to be able to
convince their colleagues, and undecided MEPs are important to swing a vote
in the preferred direction. As one car manufacturer explained, ‘You shouldn’t
try to over-lobby your clear opponents because you are just going to irritate
them and wind them up. You need to make sure that your friends – in quotes
because there is no cosy relationship like that – have the facts at their
fingertips; that you educate them a little bit on what the key issues are. In the
final analyses, when you are lobbying, it comes down to the fence-sitters
because they will swing the group position one way or the other. It is a bit
crude to say that you have friends and foes, but the usual suspects are ‘the
people in middle’ (Interview, July 2011).
Crucial to convincing MEPs of one’s position is to ‘find the right way to
open a person’s mind’ – as one interviewee explained – and frame an issue
differently when talking to a conservative, liberal or socialist MEP. When
approaching an MEP from the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists
and Democrats (S&D), the car industry would often try to focus on the social
aspects of the vans regulation, such as what impact the dossier would have on
jobs and SMEs. The German Association of the Automotive Industry would
for instance bring along a member of the Betriebsrat (German Works Council)
from one of their member companies when lobbying S&D MEPs to show that
political decisions in Brussels also affect the rights of employees. The industry
associations were also highly aware of giving an issue a national angle when
speaking to MEPs of various nationalities, and try to bring along a member
from the MEP’s country when meeting an MEP.
Both the car industry and the ENGOs focused their lobbying on the
rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs from the responsible and opinion-
giving committees. ACEA first and foremost lobbied key MEPs, while
encouraging their members to lobby their national MEPs and MEPs from
countries in which the individual companies have production sites.
Generally, both the car industry and the environmental groups refrained
from lobbying MEPs, who were vehemently against their views, and MEPs
from the fringe groups, unless they were seen as paramount for carrying a
vote at the committee or plenary stage. All the nine interviewed car
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manufacturers found it difficult to get an informative debate with the Greens
and European United Left/Nordic Green Left as these groups often refuse to
get information from the industry.
The interviewed interest groups found it particularly important to lobby
MEPs from the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) group,
which was repeatedly referred to as Parliament’s kingmaker and fence-sitter.
The ALDE group is often divided between green British and French MEPs and
industry-friendly German MEPs. On the vans regulation, the ALDE group
was completely split during the committee discussions with the shadow
rapporteur (German MEP, Holger Krahmer) in ENVI siding with the car
industry and the ENVI coordinator (British MEP, Chris Davies) taking up the
views of T&E. Whereas Holger Krahmer tabled amendments supporting a
long-term target of 150 g/km by 2020, Chris Davies tabled amendments
suggesting a target of 125 g/km. The division within the ALDE group shows
that the ascendancy of the centre-right majority following the 2009 EP
elections – when the ALDE and the European People’s Party voted together –
does not appear to have provided industry groups with a more favourable
lobbying venue.
Throughout the EP policy process, T&E worked closely with Chris Davies
by providing him with in-depth policy analyses, expertise and arguments. T&E
would for example send an email to make Chris Davies aware of surveys
reported in the German tabloid AutoBild on whether or not people want speed
limiters for vans, and provide updates on vans regulation in China and the
United States. The close working relationship between T&E and the ALDE
coordinator amounts to what Hall and Deardoff (2006) would describe as
legislative subsidy – organised interests take up the role of being a service
bureau or adjuncts to staff for carefully selected legislators in support of
shared policy objectives. As Chris Davies explained when asked how he made
up his mind on the vans regulation, ‘my support of a long-term target of 125
[g CO2/km] came from the T&E. I worked closely with T&E. They helped me
build my arguments and provided me with research that supported my
position. I appreciate the T&E’s support, but I don’t know how effective they
have been in changing people’s minds. What you really want is to have a
company supporting T&E’s position [y] then it would really carry weight’
(Interview, August 2011). The ALDE coordinator contacted leasing
companies and SMEs in support of the Commission’s proposal to encourage
them to become active. Prompted by Chris Davies, the European Small
Business Alliance sent a letter to all ENVI members 2 months before the
committee vote, expressing its support for the Commission’s draft proposal.
This illustrates that lobbying is not a ‘one-way alley’ as MEPs may stimulate
interest groups to become active on a dossier to gain support for their
position inside Parliament.
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The EP Policy Process and Outcome
The European Commission’s proposal was put forward to ENVI as the
responsible committee in December 2009 with the committees of ‘industry,
research and energy’ (ITRE) and ‘transport and tourism’ as opinion-giving
committees. ITRE was assigned associate committee status following the
so-called ‘reinforced Hughes’ procedure, which aims to engage committees in
enhanced cooperation when a piece of legislation intersects the policy remit of
several committees (Corbett et al, 2007, p. 136). Many of the policy proposals
referred to ENVI have both environmental and competitiveness implications,
increasing the occurrence of turf battles between the EP’s committees. Similar
to the European Commission’s DGs, EP committees are often biased towards
their policy priorities with ENVI often prioritising environmental over industry
concerns. In several cases, where a legislative proposal has both environmental
and competitiveness implications, the EP’s Conference of Presidents has
responded by invoking the enhanced Hughes procedure. Owing to the
increased cooperation between the EP’s committees, the car industry generally
saw the EP as a better aggregator of demands than the European Commission.
This was however not a view shared by the environmental groups as they did not
find that the vans regulation accommodated their views. As can be seen from the
Table 1, the industry’s and ENGOs’ preference attainment varied throughout the
policy process.
Initially, the rapporteur of ENVI, British conservative MEP Martin
Callanan, was not entirely convinced about the need for regulating CO2 emis-
sions from vans following the argument that vans are bought by businesses,
which are already conscious of the need for economy and fuel efficiency. In his
first report, he expressed doubts about the feasibility of the proposed long-term
target of 135 g CO2/km by 2020. Given the higher costs of reducing CO2 in light
commercial vehicles compared to cars, and the longer development and
production cycles needed, he argued that a target of 150 g CO2/km would be a
more achievable target. Lastly, the draft report included two new provisions,
which were not included in the European Commission’s proposal, although these
were considered in its impact assessment:
K The possibility of pooling between vans and passenger cars (averaging
between distances to targets) for manufacturers that produce both cars and
light commercial vehicles.
K The introduction of mandatory speed limiters for light commercial vehicles
of 120 km/hour (European Parliament, 2010b).
Martin Callanan’s first draft report was welcomed by ACEA, whereas the
ENGOs regretted that the initial European Commission proposal had been
weakened. Although the rapporteur’s draft report favoured the views of
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Table 1: Key changes to the European Commission’s proposal
Short-term target Long-term target The excess
premium (in h/g)
Other provisions
The European
Commission’s proposal
175 g CO2/km by 2016, with phase-in
from 2014 to 2016
(75 per cent/80 per cent/
100 per cent)
135 g CO2/km by 2020 120 —
The ENVI rapporteur’s
draft report
Supports the Commission’s
proposal
150 g CO2/km by 2020 95 Speed limiters, pooling
between vans and cars
included
ENVI’s final report Supports the Commission’s
proposal
140 g CO2/km by 2020 95 Speed limiters excluded,
pooling between vans
and cars included
Plenary vote 175 g CO2/km by 2017 with
phase-in from 2014 to 2017
(70 per cent/75 per cent/
80 per cent/100 per cent)
147 g CO2/km by 2020 95 Speed limiters and
pooling between vans
and cars excluded
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industry in terms of easing the long-term target and reducing the penalty
premium, it did not give in to industry pressures to delay the phase-in of the
short-term target. Furthermore, the idea of speed limiters was included in the
first draft report, which was an issue T&E and Greenpeace were lobbying for.
Although Greenpeace knew that amendments introducing speed limiters
would be met with fierce opposition from key German MEPs and the
German government, they hoped that MEPs could at least use it as a
bargaining chip in the trialogue meetings to secure a more ambitious long-
term CO2 reduction target. As expressed by Greenpeace, ‘we thought that it
would be fantastic to win the issue of speed limiters fully and it would be
fantastic to have it in the legislation but we weren’t quite so reckless in our
thinking. It would have been a good way to negotiate with the Council’
(Interview, August 2011).
As the main controversy within and outside Parliament was the long-term
target, ENGOs did not, however, find that the report accommodated their
views. During the debates in ENVI, the discussion on vans was nationally
dominated between MEPs from car-manufacturing and non-car-manufactur-
ing countries. The Italian, French and German MEPs across the political
groups were fairly critical of the European Commission’s proposal, and sided
with the industry’s view. German MEPs were very much influenced by the
German car-industry and suggested that the long-term target should be
increased to 160 g CO2/km (the industry position). However, before the vote
in ENVI, the rapporteur and shadow rapporteur struck a deal to support a
long-term target of 140 g CO2/km in order to get the socialists, greens and
liberal MEPs to support the committee report. The 140 g CO2/km long-term
target was adopted despite ITRE’s and the ENVI rapporteur’s suggestion to
have a 2020 target of 150 g CO2/km, and significant lobbying from the car
industry. This suggests that socialist, greens and liberal MEPs were
influenced by the environmental lobby, and that the ENVI report would
have been closer to the car industry’s position without lobbying from the
T&E and Greenpeace. Although it is difficult to know what the outcome
would have been without lobbying from environmental groups, they had an
impact on the arguments used by MEPs favourable to their views. As a
representative from Greenpeace said, ‘I do believe that we made an effect at
least to inspiring those MEPs who were promoting a green line. That’s what
you do when you lobby Parliament – you give people ideas’ (Interview,
August 2011).
The final ENVI report lowered the level of the penalty for non-compliance
from h120/g to h95/g, and decreased the ambition of the 2020 long-term target
from 135 g CO2/km to 140 g CO2/km. Amendments on pooling between cars
and vans as well as introducing speed limiters were defeated (European
Parliament, 2010a).
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A first reading agreement was reached between the Council and Parliament
in February 2011 following intense negotiations in trialogue meetings. The
first reading agreement meant that there was no room for interest groups to
influence the outcome of Parliament’s plenary vote as MEPs voted, and
adopted, the compromise reached between Parliament and the Council. On
15 February 2011, an absolute majority of MEPs voted in favour of the
Council and Parliament’s compromise, which decreased the long-term target
to 147 g CO2/km by 2020 (European Parliament and Council of the
European Union, 2011). This target was based on a political compromise
between the Council and Parliament as the Council initially opted for a long-
term target of 155 g CO2/km and Parliament for 140 g CO2/km. Most
interviewees were surprised that the Council and the EP managed to strike a
first reading deal given the genuine disagreement both within and between
the two institutions. Germany was particularly sceptical about introducing
any long-term target below 155 g CO2/km. In the end, Germany supported a
long-term target of 147 g CO2/km as they were offered a concession on the
regulation on ‘state aid to facilitate the closure of uncompetitive coal mines’
(European Commission, 2010). The example brings to light the complexity of
EU decision-making, in which numerous factors affect the final policy
outcome. Horse-trading, concessions and compromises are key features of
EU decision-making and necessities to reach agreements across member
states and institutions. With its enormous diversity of interests, EU policy
making would inexorably result in a joint decision-making trap (Scharpf,
1988) – where agreements reflect the lowest common denominator – if
it was not for the extensive use of informal strategies to prevent political
stalemates.
Although it is difficult to know what the final long-term target would have
been without the existence of lobbying, most interviewees argue that the
outcome would have been more ambitious without the lobbying from the car
industry. As the draft person in the European Commission expressed, ‘in my
mind, there is no doubt that the car-industry managed to water down the
proposal. Look at the final policy outcomey the environmental organisations
had none of their views reflected’ (Interview, August 2011). However, one issue
played against the effectiveness of the car industry’s lobbying on this dossier:
the car industry’s credibility. Some MEPs had the perception that the car
industry fought too hard and over-achieved on the car-passenger CO2
regulation: ‘there was a view in the environment committee that the industry
had somehow misled MEPs and had been too successful on the passenger cars
regulation, and that there should be a bit of a pay-back this time’ (Interview
with car-manufacturer, July 2011). This may explain why the ENVI report
opted for a long-term target of 140 g CO2/km rather than 150 g CO2/km as
suggested in the rapporteur’s report.
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Discussion: What Factors Explain the Outcome?
The findings from the vans regulation show that the EP no longer appears to
be a particularly sympathetic venue to environmental groups. This finding is
also supported by recent findings by Smith (2008) and Burns and Carter
(2010), suggesting that the conclusions drawn from the vans regulation go
beyond the specific case. Smith’s (2008) research on the End-of-Life Vehicles
Directive and REACH shows that the EP’s green credentials is contingent
upon the degree to which MEPs are exposed to lobbying from both diffuse
and concentrated interests, and the level of overlap between the policy
realms of the EP committees. Burns and Carter’s (2010) study of whether the
EP’s reputation as a green champion is still deserved finds that the EP has
toned down its demands for stringent EU environmental regulation over
time. Similarly, on the vans regulation, the EP did not assume the role of
environmental policy champion. While the ENVI report and the final text
did not favour the views of ENGOs, nor did it simply capitulate to the
demands of the car industry.
Why did the EP agree on a text that went against its traditional role as a
defender of environment interests? Three explanations to this question
repeatedly came up during the interviews: asymmetric lobbying from the car
industry, a change in the EP’s negotiating strategy, and increased cooperation
between the EP committees. The first explanation – asymmetric lobbying –
relates to the activities of the involved interest groups, whereas the latter two
relate to the question of how the EP as an institutional venue shapes policy
actors’ (interest groups, MEPs and EP policy advisors) behaviour.
First, all interviewees agreed that the long-term target would have been
closer to the European Commission’s position without lobbying from the car
industry. In the European Commission’s mind, there was no doubt that the car
industry managed to water down the proposal as nobody else, other than the
car industry, lobbied for less stringent targets. If the car industry had not
lobbied, there would have been no incentive for MEPs to defend the industry’s
view. In the words of an ACEA representative, ‘if we had not said anything
that would have meant that we would have agreed with what was on the
table [the Commission’s proposal]. Either it would have stayed at what the
Commission proposed or gone down following lobbying from T&E’ (Inter-
view, September 2011). Similar to the findings of Smith (2008), the vans
regulation suggests that when MEPs are exposed asymmetrically to industry
lobbying on a specific dossier, they are less likely to support ambitious
environmental provisions than those who are more evenly exposed to lobbying
from opposing interest groups. When legislators are subject to a variety of
alternative understandings of a specific policy issue, they are likely to
reconsider and mould their support for a specific policy proposal.
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Second, a more compelling, institutional, explanation of why the EP did not
take up the role as a champion for diffuse interests has to do with a change in
the EP’s negotiating strategy. As one EP committee administrator explained,
‘the EP can take two positions: it can propose a very ambitious target and have
some negotiation margin, or it can propose something that is realistic – Martin
Callanan took up the last strategy’ (Interview, July 2011). All interviewees
agreed that the rapporteur tried to steer a middle ground between competing
demands in Parliament, and took up a realistic position that would be
acceptable for the Council given Germany’s sceptical position. The increased
use of informal meetings between the EP and the Council from before the first
reading means that the EP can more effectively predict which amendments
have a chance of being accepted by the Council. Martin Callanan’s approach
can therefore be seen as part of a process of anticipatory compliance, whereby
the EP moderates its demands to increase the likelihood of reaching an
agreement with the Council. It is widely acknowledged by EU scholars that the
introduction of new formal and informal decision-making rules has altered the
dynamics between the EU institutions (see for instance Shackleton, 2000;
Burns and Carter, 2010; Reh et al, forthcoming). In the past, the EP saw itself
as part of a long-term institutional game to increase its powers and was
prepared to adopt challenging amendments or even sacrifice legislation to
boost its legislative powers. With the application of the ordinary legislative
procedure to most areas under the Lisbon Treaty, the EP has won its ‘battles
for more legislative powers’ (Burns and Carter, 2010, pp. 16–18). This has in
turn led the EP to moderate its demands to be seen as a credible and serious
legislative player.
Lastly, several interviewees found that there was better cooperation and
communication between the EP committees than between the European Com-
mission’s DGs, and therefore saw the EP as a better aggregator of demands. It
is not unusual for the European Commission to suffer from strong in-fighting
between Commissioners. There is often a turf war between DG Environment/
DG Climate Action favouring environmental concerns and DG Enterprise
and Industry advancing industry concerns. Likewise, ‘there are often disputes
between the environment and industry [in the EP] with the industry committee
supporting a pro-industry line, and the environment committee taking up a
pro-environment line, although Parliament tends to arbitrate between the two
lines’ (Interview, MEP, August 2011). The increased cooperation between
the EP committees as a result of the introduction of the reinforced Hughes
procedure in 2002 has led to increased communication and cooperation
between the EP committees. When the Hughes procedure is enforced, reports
from responsible committees are less likely to be carried on the floor without
taking into account the views of MEPs from associate committees. Committee
members, particularly rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs, act as cue-givers
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to non-committee members, who have less information and often less intense
preferences (Ringe, 2010). The more committees are involved in the scrutiny of
a legislative proposal, the higher the diversity of cues given from expert MEPs
to non-expert MEPs, rendering the position of the lead committee more vul-
nerable to changes during plenary. ENVI amendments are thus less likely to be
carried on the floor without concessions to the competitiveness concerns of
ITRE MEPs.
The increased degree of horizontal policy coordination between the EP’s
committees has to be seen in tandem with a general change in the EU’s
environmental regulatory discourse and a change in the saliency of environ-
mental policies from silent to salient (Wurzel, 2012). Until the late 1990s, EU
environmental politics was largely driven by an environmental advocacy
coalition consisting of the EP’s ENVI committee, the European Commission’s
DG Environment and an Environmental Council (Wurzel, 2012). The sectoral
autonomy of EU policy making with weak horizontal policy coordination
made it possible for the EP’s ENVI committee together with the European
Commission’s DG Environment to act as policy champions for environmental
groups. ‘Since 2000 the EP has been increasingly influenced by the EU’s
general fixation with the Lisbon Agenda’ and its focus on creating a competi-
tive economy (Burns and Carter, 2010, p. 15). Environmental legislation is
increasingly viewed through a competitive lens – rather than merely being
embedded in an environmental frame – with closer attention paid to the
competitive implications of environmental policies. The Europe 2020 Strategy,
replacing the Lisbon Strategy, has become a point of reference for much of the
EU’s current legislation, and created overlap between policy realms of the
European Commission’s DGs, the EP’s committees and the Council’s working
groups. The increased horizontal policy coordination has diminished the EP’s
previous role as a defender of environmental interests.
Conclusion
Why did the EP accept a text that diluted the environmental ambition of the
European Commission’s proposal instead of taking up its traditional role as a
policy champion for environmental groups? This article has shown that both
factors pertaining to the specific case of the vans regulation as well as wider EP
institutional changes explain why the EP did not act as a conduit for diffuse
interests on the vans regulation.
First, MEPs, MEP assistants and EP policy advisors were asymmetrically
exposed to lobbying from the car industry as ENGOs were both less numerous
and active in pressing their demands before Parliament. Although the T&E and
Greenpeace did not have any of their demands included in the final outcome,
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they managed to launch and sustain a debate within the EP on the issue of
speed limiters. Several interviewees doubt that the discussion on speed limiters
would have been so prevalent in Parliament had Greenpeace and T&E not
lobbied so strongly in favour of it. Although Greenpeace and the T&E
fervently supported the inclusion of speed limiters within the scope of the vans
regulation, they knew it would be difficult to get through the Council owing to
the opposition from Germany. Nevertheless, they hoped that if Parliament
could not get it included in the vans regulation during the trialogue meetings, it
could at least provide a basis for obtaining concessions on the long-term target.
Second, lobbying on one dossier cannot be seen in isolation from other
dossiers. The vans regulation closely mirrored the existing legislation on the
reduction of CO2 emissions from passenger cars. As all the big dragons had
been slain in the debate on the reduction of CO2 emissions from passenger cars
in 2007–2008, lobbying on the vans regulation was restricted to a small number
of issues. The car industry’s credibility was questioned by several MEPs as
there was a general feeling within ENVI that the car industry had fought too
hard on the passenger cars regulation. This may explain why the final
committee report suggested a more stringent long-term target than the one put
forward in the rapporteur’s draft report. Furthermore, the very nature of EU
legislation as closely mirroring existing legislation means that there is often
little room for interest groups to change the thrust of a legislative proposal,
limiting the risk of business capture.
Third, wider institutional changes inside the EP and between the EU
institutions mean that the EP has sought to moderate its environmental
demands. These institutional changes relate to increased cooperation between
the EP committees (responsible and opinion-giving committees), a change in
the EP’s negotiating strategy, and a change in the EU’s regulatory discourse.
Although turf wars between ENVI and ITRE are an oft-occurring feature in
Parliament, the increased cooperation between the two means that policy
outcomes tend to steer a middle course. The increased cooperation between the
EP’s committees – following the introduction of the revised Hughes procedure
in 2002 – has to be seen in connection with a general change in the EU’s
environmental regulatory discourse. Environmental legislation is increasingly
viewed through a competitive lens with closer attention paid to the competitive
implications of environmental policies. In addition to this, the EP also appears
to have changed its strategy when negotiating with the Council from being a
challenging, and at times stubborn, player to becoming a more constructive
legislative player. In the vans regulation, this was exemplified with the
rapporteur taking up a position that would serve as a reasonable point of
departure for reaching an agreement with the Council. Thus, although
Parliament has in the past been seen as an environmental trailblazer advocating
the views of environmental interests, it now appears to be more of an
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environmental pragmatist. This has in turn reduced the privileged position
once held by diffuse interests, and provided concentrated interests with a more
favourable European parliamentary arena in which they can advance their
demands.
Note
1 Two European Commission officials, two diplomats from the German and Belgium EU permanent
representations, four MEPs, six EP policy advisors and assistants, nine car industry repre-
sentatives, two SME representatives, and two representatives of environmental organisations.
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